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While there is substantial literature examining the flow of foreign
investments into various regions of the world, there is still lack of
research focus on foreign investment activities in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA).  One objective of this paper is to reme-
dy this neglect and extend previous empirical work by focusing on
foreign investments in that region. The second objective is to focus
on non-traditional determinants that have tended to be overlooked
or underestimated in previous research. The paper will focus on
factors such as governance, legal environment, and economic free-
dom and examine their impact on foreign investment activities in
the MENA region.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to focus on two significant research ques-
tions that have not yet been thoroughly examined in the literature on foreign
investment. Over the last 15 years, the flow of foreign investment around the
world has been growing spectacularly. While international trade has doubled,
the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased by a factor of 10
(Levy-Yeyati et.al, 2003). Within the various regional growth of foreign invest-
ment, FDI flowing to developing countries has accounted for about 40 per cent
of global FDI (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002). Although there is substantial literature
examining the flow of foreign investments into various regions of the world,
unfortunately the majority of this research has focused on U.S. foreign invest-
ment activities in Europe, NAFTA Signatory nations, Asia and Pacific Rim
nations, and economies in transition (Kingsley & Crumbley, 1997).  There is a
paucity of information and studies relating to joint ventures and foreign invest-
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ment activities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  The first
objective of this paper is to remedy this neglect and extend previous empirical
work by focusing on foreign investment in the MENA region. 
When looking at foreign investment data within the MENA region,  one
can’t help but notice the wide variability in the flow of foreign investment and
joint venture activities, and wonder why  some countries are more attractive to
foreign investments than others. In trying to determine some of the factors that
impact foreign investment flow, it is important to distinguish between three cat-
egories of foreign investment, these are: 1) market seeking; 2) resource seek-
ing; and 3) efficiency seeking investments (Dunning, 1993).  A 1998 UNCTAD
report argued that globalization has led to a reconfiguration of the ways in
which multinationals pursue these various types of foreign investments, and
changed the motives for and the determinants of FDI (Dunning, 1999).  For
example, in recent years, foreign investment in developing countries has shift-
ed from market and resource seeking investments, to more efficiency seeking
investments (Dunning, 2002). This has prompted some to argue that the rela-
tive importance of some of the traditional market related factors (relative wage
costs, infrastructure, macroeconomic policy) no longer hold (Loree and
Guisinger 1995) and to suggest that less traditional determinants have become
more important (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 2001; Addison and
Heshmati, 2003; Becchetti and Hasan, 2004). Furthermore, given that in recent
years, the region is witnessing a new era in privatization, bank regulation and
market-oriented financial institutions (Omran, 2004), the need to examine the
role of alternative determinants is even more relevant.  
The majority of the countries in that region are neither big enough to
attract a significant number of market seeking foreign investment, nor resource
rich enough to attract resource seeking foreign investment.  Therefore, in ana-
lyzing foreign investment in the MENA region the second objective of this
paper is to focus on some of the non-traditional factors that have tended to be
overlooked or underestimated in previous research on foreign investment. In
light of this focus, the paper will thus consider factors such as governance, legal
environment, and economic freedom and examine their impact on foreign
investment in the MENA region.
Hypotheses
Foreign Investment and the MENA Region
Foreign investment has numerous effects on the economy of the recipient
country. It influences the labor market, income, prices, export and import (Erdal
and Tatoglu. 2002). It is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology and
a positive contributor to economic growth (Lim, 2001). Unfortunately howev-
er, the recent unprecedented growth in foreign investment activities has largely
bypasses the Arab world (UNCTAD, 1999).  Compared with other developing
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countries, the capital inflow in the Arab world has remained constant at about
$10 billion in the last 2 decades, whereas it has increased four times to reach
$300 billion in other developing countries, mainly in East Asia, Latin America
and increasingly in Central Europe. Recent analysis revealed that the Arab
world received on average 1% of global FDI in the 1990s compared to 2% of
their share in world GDP. Most of these FDIs were concentrated in six Arab
countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia
and were mostly undertaken in the oil, petrochemical, and manufacturing
industries, especially textiles, metals and minerals (Sadik and Bolbol, 2001).
Comparing inward FDI performance with potential for the same region
produces a  matrix representing front runners, below potential, above potential
and under performers respectively: 
High FDI Performance Low FDI performance
High FDI potential Front Runners: Bahrain, Below Potential: Egypt, Kuwait,
Jordan, Israel Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE 
Low FDI potential Above Potential: Morocco, Under-Performers: Algeria, Iran,
Sudan Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen
Source UNCTAD: Inward FDI performance and potential 1999-2001.
Further examination of some of the countries in this matrix reveals some
interesting information.  For example, although it is the largest economy in
Eastern Europe, the European Union’s sixth biggest trading partner, and the
world’s 7th largest emerging economy, Turkey is an under-performer. FDI flow
into Turkey is only a fraction of the level of FDI attracted to countries of com-
parable size and development like Argentina and Mexico, and only one-quarter
of the level of FDI attracted into Poland (Loewendahl, and Ertugal-
Loewendahl,  2000).  On the other hand, a significantly smaller country,
Bahrain has managed to be a front runner. The country has been able to attract
foreign investment through significant incentives such as labor subsidies, elec-
tricity and land rental rebates, 100% rebate on customs duties for major equip-
ment/raw materials, export credit facilities and tariff protection. Many investors
cited the country’s tax structure as their key motivation to invest. Bahrain
imposes virtually no personal tax, no restriction on capital or profit repatriation
and most significantly no corporate taxation. (Gilmore, et al. 2003).
It is important to note that the recent shift from markets and resources
seeking investments, toward more of an efficiency seeking investment could –
if properly exploited – be advantageous to the MENA countries due to their rel-
atively small market sizes and limited natural resources.  The main objective of
market-seeking investment is to meet demand in the domestic market. In
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resource-seeking investment, the objective is to make use of the host country
resources to produce goods for sale outside the local market (Asiedu, 2002).
Demands and resources however, are less relevant in efficiency seeking invest-
ment, where the emphasis is more on the efficiency with which foreign
investors can operate, network, sell and export their products to other countries.
Therefore, in striving to attract foreign investment, the most viable among the
alternatives for the MENA region, would be a focus on efficiency seeking
investors. Such notion reinforces the importance of examining efficiency
enhancing elements such as governance, the legal system and economic free-
dom and their impact on foreign investment.
Governance 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) suggested that governance represents the
public institutions and policies created by governments as a framework for eco-
nomic and social relations. Kaufmann et. al (2000) defined governance as the
traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a partic-
ular country. Good governance infrastructure is a complex, multifaceted con-
cept generally manifested in a country’s accountability, government effective-
ness, regulatory burden, political stability, rule of law and control of corruption
(Kaufmann, et. al, 1999a, and 1999b).  It contributes to the effective imple-
mentation of economic policies and helps to determine whether or not there is
a sound, attractive business environment for investment. It provides the mech-
anism to minimize policy distortions, reduces information asymmetries and
uncertainties, increases the flexibility of a country to respond to economic
shocks and makes it easier to start, run and expand new businesses (World
Bank, 2003) 
Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found governance infrastructure to be an
important direct determinant of location choice by U.S. investors.   The pres-
ence or lack of the various elements of governance has the potential to effect a
host country’s attractiveness to foreign investment.  One particular element that
has been widely related to governance and associated with foreign investment
is transparency.  Lack of transparency or opacity - a term largely associated
with bribery and corruption, is a particular and common sign of lack of good
governance (World Bank, 2003).  Davis and Ruhe (2003) found a highly sig-
nificant relationship between corruption and foreign investment. Thesedays,
prospective investors are paying attention to the realities of corruption in some
foreign countries (Conklin, 2002). Corruption has been a significant obstacle
for U.S. investors due to the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which has outlawed foreign bribery. In theory a firm will be less likely to enter
a non-transparent country because of the increased risks, uncertainty and costs
of doing business.  On the other hand, a country that takes steps to increase the
degree of transparency and reduce corruption could expect a significant
increase in the level of foreign investment. On average, a country could expect
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a 40% increase in FDI from a one point increase in their transparency ranking
(Drabek and Payne, 2001).  
Beyond U.S. investors, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) also found gover-
nance infrastructure to be an important determinant of both FDI inflows and
outflows in most countries; however they found that FDI will be more strong-
ly affected by improvements in governance in developing countries than in
developed countries.  The returns to investments in good governance were
greater for developing and transition economies.  Unfortunately, the quality of
governance in the MENA region is very poor.  When compared with countries
that have similar incomes and characteristics – the main competitors in the
global marketplace – the MENA region ranks at the bottom of the index of
overall governance quality (World Bank, 2003). Consequently, in 1999-2001, 6
out of the bottom 10 countries in inward FDI performance from various regions
in the world were from the MENA region, namely Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, UAE and Yemen. The remaining countries were Malawi, Indonesia,
Gabon and Suriname (UNCTAD, 2002).  Looking back at the above matrix,
these 6 MENA countries were categorized as either below potential or under
performers in terms of their performance in foreign investment.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the level of governance
and the flow of foreign investment in MENA countries. 
Legal System
Several papers have argued that the legal system can play a key role in
attracting foreign investments or encouraging financial and economic develop-
ment (LaPorta et. al., 1998a, 1998b; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Chan-Lee
and Ahn, 2001).  Generally, the legal system around the world can be classified
according to whether its origins are primarily in pure common law based on the
English system, or pure civil law based on the Roman system - with specific
categories in French, Spanish, German, Scandinavian, or Socialist.  Other clas-
sifications include countries with customary or religious laws (Muslim,
Talmudic etc.), or a mixture of two or more systems (LaPorta et.al, 1998b;
Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Chan-Lee and Ahn, 2001). 
A legal environment that protects investors can be significant in
investors’ decision making (LaPorta, et. al, 1999).   For example, in Common
Law countries managers have less flexibility in exercising discretion over
reported earnings.  Hence, the relation between reported earnings in financial
statements and the “economic value” of the firm is expected to be stronger.
Such factors might persuade joint venture investors to favour Common Law
countries, as they can feel more secured about their investments.  This is not
true in Code Law (another classification based on an all-inclusive system of
written rules) in countries where the law allows more latitude in accounting
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practices to smooth earning. More latitude implies that the financial figures in
Code Law countries are to be perceived as less of a reflection of economic real-
ity (Guenther & Young, 2000). 
Countries whose commercial legal systems are rooted in English
Common Law have less market regulations and are better at protecting share-
holders and creditors, and at preserving property rights (LaPorta, et al., 1998a,
1999, 2001; Djankov et al., 2002).   They also have low cost of contracting
because the legal system interprets the spirit rather than the letter of the con-
tract (Lang and So, 2002). Common Law facilitates the development of capital
markets and investment opportunities and as a result attracts more foreign
investment (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003, Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  An
anasysis of the relationship between U.S. foreign direct investment and legal
systems has clearly indicated that countries whose legal systems are rooted in
English Common Law are more likely to be recipients of U.S. FDI flows
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). According to the authors, Civil law regimes
are expected to attract less foreign investment because they are likely to be
associated with higher durations of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less
honesty and fairness and inferior access to justice. 
Within the MENA region, the legal system is rooted in various origins. If
we are to spread the countries across a spectrum, at one end would be situated
those countries that observe the sharia, and at the other end, would be those
whose legal system have developed far from it (Shaaban, 1999). When it comes
to commercial transactions it is possible to group MENA countries into 3 cate-
gories. First are those that followed the Western system such as Lebanon, Syria
and Egypt. Second are those that have codified their laws but drew mostly from
sharia such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen. Third are countries that went
both ways.  They westernised their commercial laws but still draw from Islamic
law in such areas as contracts.  These countries include Iraq, Jordan and Libya
(Shaaban, 1999). To date there has been no academic research examining the
impact of the legal system on foreign investment in the MENA region, howev-
er, Globerman and Shapiro (2003) suggested that countries that adopt a legal
system that mixes common law with customary or religious law are less likely
to receive FDI.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between countries whose legal
systems are rooted in Common Law and the level of foreign investment in
MENA countries. 
Economic Freedom 
Beyond governance and legal systems, another element that could have
an impact on foreign investment is economic freedom, especially with regards
to aspects of  a country’s trade policy, its banking and finance services and its
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property right protection (Drabek and Payne, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro,
2003). Gwartney, et.al.(2003) suggested that the key ingredients to economic
freedom include freedom to compete, voluntary exchange, and protection of
person and property.   O’Doriscoll et.al. (2001: 43) defined economic freedom
as “the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distri-
bution or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for
citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.” 
Open trade and investment regimes are particularly powerful instruments
to attract investments in general and foreign investments in particular (Drabek
and Payne, 2001).  There is strong empirical evidence for positive contribution
of trade liberalization on FDI inflows (Selowsky and Martin, 1997). Countries
open to international trade provide a good platform for global business opera-
tions and reflect their competitiveness (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002).
Unfortunately however, responding to protectionist and special interest politics,
virtually all countries adopt trade barriers of various types (Gwartney et.al.,
2003).  Trade barriers lower productive efficiency by reducing competition and
raising transaction costs (Harms and Ursprung, 2002). The extent of the host
country’s tariff and non tariff barriers, import and export limitations, and licens-
ing requirements can have a direct bearing on foreign actors’ ability to pursue
economic goals and present roadblocks that limit international trade and restrict
the flow of foreign investment (Drabek and Payne, 2001).
In the area of  banking and finance, heavy bank regulations and the
absence of an independent oversight of financial services, lack of a safe and
sound financial sector, and inadequate financial systems that meet basic fiduci-
ary responsibilities can restrict economic freedom (O’Doriscoll et.al, 2001).
This, in addition to weak enforcement of contract and protection against fraud
can interfere with the market provision of financial services and create disin-
centive for foreign actors to invest in the host country (Beck, Levin and Loayza,
2000). 
Finally, economic freedom would be meaningless if individuals do not
have secure rights to property. Poor protection of property rights is sure to deter
investment and undermine the operation of a market-exchange system
(Gwartney, et.al., 2003).  It determines the legal rights of foreign firms and lim-
itation on foreign ownership (De Mello, 1997); Protecting privately held assets
from arbitrary direct or indirect appropriation encourage sunk cost investments
by multinational corporations (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). The protection
of property rights is vital for firms to pursue new investments and ensure that
they will see profit from their endeavors.  Without this profit incentive there is
little motivation to take risks and invest (Drabek and Payne, 2001). 
Within MENA countries, enhancing economic freedom in terms of trade,
the financial sector and property rights is of absolute importance if the region
is to attract more foreign investments.  According to a World Bank report
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(World Bank, 2003), foreign investment  could be five to six times what they
are today, if exports other than oil were higher and were in better investment
climates. Inefficient and costly services provided mostly by the public sector,
raise the cost of MENA merchandise exports and limit attractiveness to invest-
ment (World Bank, 2003).  The financial sector is controlled by state owned
banks which dominate banking activities (up to 95% of assets in several coun-
tries in the MENA region) resulting in poor services, high costs, and weak
financing of new investments and trade (World Bank, 2003). Due to a complete
lack of faith in its domestic economic infrastructure, the Middle East holds the
largest share of wealth abroad in the world, with $350 billion currently collect-
ing interest abroad, rather than in local financial institutions1.
Finally, property rights, although protected by the constitution in many
countries, face many delays and obstacles from the legal system. Dispute reso-
lution can be difficult and uncertain, enforcement of judgments is not always
easy, and judicial proceedings could go on for several years.  In Egypt, it can
take 6 years for a commercial case to be decided and with appeals could be
extended beyond 15.  In Qatar, the legal system is biased in favor of citizens
and the government. In Saudi Arabia, The U.S. Department of State reported
that in several cases disputes have caused serious problems for foreign
investors by preventing their departure from the country, blocking their access
to exit visas, or imposing restraint of personal property pending the adjudica-
tion of a commercial dispute.  In the end, trade policies that impose inefficien-
cies and foreign investment restrictions, heavy bank regulation, in addition to
expropriation of property, are signs of weak economic freedom and can be an
obstacle to foreign investment as it can be indicative of the various ways in
which a government may take away potential profits (Conklin, 2002).  
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between economic freedom and
the level of foreign investment in the MENA countries. 
Methods
Model Specification
Foreign Investment  = Constant +  ß1 Governance  + ß2. Legal System + ß3.
Economic Freedom + [ß4-11 Control Variables] + [ß12 Time Trend or ß12-23 Year
Dummies] +  Error Term
That is: 
Foreign Investment [( Joint Venture,  JV +  Foreign Direct Investment, FDI,)
/Gross Domestic Product, GDP ] = Constant +  ß1 Governance  + ß2 Legal
System + ß3 Economic Freedom + [ß4 Inflation Level + ß5 Wage Rate + ß6
Technological Infrastructure + ß7 Economic Growth +  ß8 Education Level  +
ß9 Composite Risk + ß10 Market Size (Population)+ ß11 Fuel Economy Dummy]
+ ß12 Time Trend (OR  ß12-23Year Dummies) + Error Term  
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Sample and Data 
The paper analyzed both joint venture and FDI activities in the MENA
region using data from 1990-2001.  The idea was to start with a sample repre-
senting of all the countries in the MENA region.  However, I had to eliminate
some of the countries due to lack of consistent data for all of the variables over
the 12 year period. In the end, the sample size consisted of the following 12
countries:  Egypt, the Islamic Republic of  Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Oman,  Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. 
Measures
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable foreign investment is a combination of total for-
eign inflow of funds in a given country in a given year as a percentage of GDP
of respective countries.   The inflow of funds is composed of two components:
total joint venture (JV) related inflow of funds and the foreign direct investment
(FDI) associated with each of the sample countries.  The traditional literature
uses FDI using the UNCTAD (1998) or World Bank Development Indicators
which do not explicitly include the joint venture activities undertaken by each
of these countries. The JV data was collected from the “Joint Venture” compo-
nent of the Security Data Corporations (SDC) database of the Thompson
Financial Corporation.  It is an aggregate dollar amount of the total joint ven-
ture deals signed by individuals and companies by each of the sample countries
with other foreign companies and nationals.   The other component of the
dependent variable, the net flow of net Foreign Direct Investment, was collect-
ed from the World Bank’s Development Indicators (data was also confirmed by
checking the UNCTAD (1998) source on FDI).2 I have estimated alternative
regressions using JV and FDI as dependent variables separately and given that
the results of alternative definitions do not change the economic or statistical
significance of our three focus variables, I only report the estimations based on
the broader definition of Foreign Investment,  i.e. the combination of JV+FDI.  
Independent Variables
Governance
The governance variable is based on an index developed by
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b, 2003). The index is an
aggregate of the following 6 constructs: rule of law, corruption, voice and
accountability, government effectiveness, political instability and violence, and
regulatory burden. The governance score lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with high-
er scores corresponding to better governance.
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Legal System
The legal system data was collected from different published sources on
the legal practices followed in each of the sample countries. For example,
Egypt follows a common law structure relative to Lebanon, which follows
French or civil codes of law. Two papers have used these scores extensively
(LaPorta, et. al, 1998b, 1999).   I used a dummy variable where common law
countries are considered 1 and others considered 0.
Economic Freedom
The data for economic freedom was based on the economic freedom indi-
cators developed by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation in the
U.S. I used an index developed from an average aggregate combination of each
country’s trade policy (openness to export and import); banking and finance
(relative openness and deregulatory environment in the banking and financial
sectors, the extent of government intervention in monetary policy, and the eco-
nomic and financial policy making issues of the country); and finally the rela-
tive score given to a country based on its ranking of property rights (degree to
which private property rights are protected, and the degree to which the gov-
ernment enforces laws that protect private property). The scale on the index of
economic freedom runs from 1 to 5.  A score of 1 on the index signifies an insti-
tutional or consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic free-
dom, while a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive (for
more details see O’Doriscoll et al., 2001 and different issues of Index of
Economic Freedom).
Control Variables 
Among the control variables, Inflation level – Consumer Price Index,
Wage Rate - the wages and salaries as a percent of total national expenditure,
Economic Growth- Annual GDP growth are taken from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics,  Technological Infrastructure -telephone line per 10,000
population, Education Level – percentage of children enrolled in secondary
school, are taken from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, Economic
Growth- Annual GDP growth, Composite Risk, a variable with Combination of
Economic, Financial and Political Risk are taken from the PRS Group reports
on Composite Risk.   The dummy variable Fuel, takes a value of l if the sam-
ple country is an oil producing country (Iran, Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen) and
a value of zero for other sample countries.  I also used a time trend variable to
see whether there is a trend in FDI over the years in addition to a more direct
measure of time fixed effect by using time dummies for sample years. 
Journal of Comparative International Management    8:1
30
Analysis
I used Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to estimate the relative
importance of the independent variables in the model. Data were pooled from
12 years of data to increase the degrees of freedom. All the regressions report-
ed in the various tables were computed using White’s (1980) heteroskedastici-
ty-adjusted t-statistics which adjusts for any bias due to heteroskedasticity.  In
total I had a total of 144 observations.3
Results
Table 1 represents overall descriptive statistics of the sample observa-
tions.  In summary, the statistics shows that my sample consists of a wide range
of experiences ideal for a robust empirical analysis.  For example, the foreign
investment to GDP ratio varied from a significant positive number of a net out-
flow to a negative number in a given sample year. Almost 40% of the countries
are mostly rooted in a common law legal system.  About 25% of the observa-
tions are from countries with energy-based economies.  Table 2 provides fur-
ther details of key variables by individual countries establishing additional sup-
port for  the varied experiences and environments existing among the sample
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Foreign Investment (FI) 0.999 2.476 -5.423 19.158
Governance Index (KKZ) 0.164 0.443 -0.330 1.170
Common Law (LEGAL) 0.417 0.495 0 1.000 
Dummy
Economic Freedom 4.058 1.470 2.500 4.650
(EFREEDOM)
Inflation Level (INFLAT) 19.406 29.402 -1.272 132.824
Wages Rate (WAGES) 29.741 11.690 12.521 61.177
Technological Infrastructure 117.876 116.521 2.400 471.000
(INFRAS)
GDP Per Capita (GDPPC) 3732.52 4189.35 123.600 17018.40
Education (EDUCAT) 57.418 19.978 14.400 88.400
Composite Risk (RISK) 62.406 13.908 23.000 80.500
Population (POP) 22.814 23.073 1.420 67.380
Time Trend (TREND) 26.194 2.936 21.000 30.000
Energy Dummy (FUEL) 0.250 0.435 0 1.000
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observations. Tunisia has the highest governance score  of 1.17 while Turkey
has the lowest score of -0.33. With regards to economic freedom,  Iran is the
country with the lowest economic freedom with a score of 4.65 (on a scale of
1 to 5. Note that the higher the score the less the economic freedom), while
Jordan is the highest with a score of 2.09. 
Table 3 provides a correlation coefficient of all variables used in the
analysis.  Except in few specific cases, e.g. per capita GDP (GDPPC) and
Technological Infrastructure (INFRA) (0.735); education (EDUCAT) and
Technological Infrastructure (0.634); and finally inflation (INFLAT) and com-
posite risk (RISK) (0.569), the correlations coefficients do not show any sys-
tematic bias or problems.  To check for the robustness of the result, I re-esti-
mated the basic model by deleting variables that are highly correlated.  In fact,
these estimates provide more significant-statistics for my key independent vari-
ables.
Table 4A provides the regression analysis by reporting 6 different esti-
mates.4 The first estimate simply focuses on the key three independent vari-
ables followed by a similar regression that includes the time fixed affect by
adding time dummy variables.  Then I gradually added the other key relevant
Table 2  
Mean Values 1990-2001
Country Name FI GVRNANCE LEGAL EFREEDOM 
EGYPT 1.254 -0.150 0 3.550
IRAN -0.026 -0.290 0 4.650
ISRAEL 1.334 0.680 1.000 2.820
JORDAN 1.493 0.330 1.000 2.090
KUWAIT 0.192 0.340 0 2.500
LEBANON 0.559 -0.090 0 3.050
MOROCCO 0.624 0.190 0 2.950
OMAN 0.798 0.520 1.000 2.780
SUDAN 1.333 -0.200 1.000 3.150
TUNISIA 2.163 1.170 0 2.900
TURKEY 0.455 -0.330 0 2.800
YEMEN 1.821 -0.200 1.000 3.800
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Table 4A
Key Factors Explaining the Foreign Investment (All Sample Countries)
1 2 3 4 5 6  
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
Intercept 2.118 1.724 2.179 5.946 2.43 -1.459
(2.50)** (1.79)* (1.32) (1.99)** (0.71) (0.35)
GVRNANCE 1.657 1.658 3.757 4.573 3.031 2.824
(2.20)** (2.19)** (2.81)** (3.19)*** 3(1.88)* (1.71)*
LEGAL 0.799 0.800 2.111 2.731 2.031 1.882
(1.82)* (1.81)* (2.57)** (2.99)*** (2.10)** (1.87)*
EFREEDOM -0.424 -0.425 -1.160 -1.682 -0.825 -0.629
(1.80)* (1.79)* (2.10)** (2.59)** (1.07) (0.76)
INFLATION - - -0.012 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016
(1.08) (1.37) (1.18) (1.23)
WAGES - - 0.051 0.045 0.067 0.074
(2.41)** (2.12)** (2.82)** (2.83)**
INFRAS - - 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.38) (0.84) (0.83) (-1.00)
GDPPC - - 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(1.51) (1.86)* -(2.62)** (2.65)**
EDUCAT - - 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.020
(0.73) (0.88) (0.99) (0.96)
RISK - - -0.027 -0.007 -0.029 -0.046
(1.20) (0.29) (1.01) (1.25)
POP - - 0.034 0.042 0.047 0.049
(1.87)* (2.22)** (2.46)** (2.48)**
TREND - - - -0.144 -0.077 - 
(1.51) (0.77)
FUEL - - - - -1.789 -1.949
(2.01)** (2.14)**
Adj-R2 0.0170 0.0274 0.0386 0.0477 0.0610 0.0692
F-Statistics 1.91* 2.35** 1.68* 1.69* 1.89* 1.92*
Number 144 144 144 144 144 144
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the parameters at 1, 5, and 10 %
significance level respectively. White-corrected t-statistics are in the parenthesis.
Column 2 and 6 include time or year dummy variables for each of the sample years as
independent variables.  For brevity, I do not report them in the table.  In summary, there
is an increasing trend of foreign investment over the sample years. 
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independent variables (regression 3). I added the time trend variable (regression
4). I added the fuel dummy variable (regression 5). Finally, I used a time fixed
affect using year dummy variables instead of time trend in regression 6.  The
model statistics show a relatively low adjusted r-squared ranging from 2% to
6%. However, the goodness-of-fit statistics of these estimates is somewhat con-
sistent with the various FDI literatures (De Mallo, 1997).5 Overall, the evi-
dence indicates a strong positive and statistically significant impact of gover-
nance, legal systems, and economic freedom influencing the variability of the
inflow of foreign investment.  Better governance, legal systems with higher
protection to stockholders and countries with higher economic freedom (score
1 represents highest therefore showing a negative coefficient) are significantly
associated with higher foreign investment inflow in sample countries. 
The overall statistical significance in table 4A is best for the coefficients
of governance variable supporting the hypotheses at 1% (regression 4), 5%
(regressions 1, 2, & 3) and 10% (regressions 5 & 6) levels respectively.  The
coefficients are less significant however for the  legal system with 1% (regres-
sion 4), 5% (regression 3) and 10% (regressions 1, 2, 5 & 6) levels. Finally, they
are marginally significant for economic freedom, with 5% (regression 4) and
10% (regression 3) supports only.    In general the key results remained rela-
tively stable, except for a loss of statistical significance for economic freedom
- even after the year fixed effect and control variables were added.  A number
of additional estimates were also performed, including regression with a coun-
try fixed effect variable and regression where highly correlated variables were
deleted from the estimate.  The tables for these regressions are not included
given that the overall results did not change significantly. 
Finally, considering that among the sample countries, Israel may be an
outlier as it represents one of the most economically developed countries with
stronger ability to attract foreign investment; I therefore performed additional
estimations of the same model excluding Israel from the estimations.  These
results are presented in table 4B.  In almost all cases, these results are consis-
tent with the results listed in table 4A where Israel was included in the regres-
sion estimates.  Therefore, the relative importance of governance, legal systems
and economic freedom in affecting foreign investment suggests a consistent
and robust finding in the MENA sample countries.
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Table 4B
Key Factors Explaining the Foreign Investment (Excluding Israel)
1 2 3 4 5 6  
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
Intercept 2.376 1.948 2.267 7.583 3.864 -0.230
(2.32)** (1.70)* (1.76)* (2.08)** (0.95) (0.05)
GVRNANCE 1.742 1.742 3.814 5.572 4.160 3.939
(2.17)** (2.16)** (2.29)** (2.83)** (2.02)** (1.87)*
LEGAL 0.753 0.753 2.111 3.696 3.075 2.926
(1.61) (1.61) (1.82)* (2.47)** (2.04)** (1.89)*
EFREEDOM -0.497 -0.497 -1.191 -2.058 -1.241 -1.049
(1.74)* (1.73)* (1.78)* (2.44)** (1.33) -(1.08)
INFLATION - - -0.012 -0.022 -0.021 -0.023
(0.95) (1.57) (1.47) (1.46)
WAGES - - 0.052 0.039 0.064 0.069
(2.30)** (1.63) (2.39)** (2.41)
INFRAS - - 0.001 0.008 0.001 -0.001
(0.15) (1.15) (0.09) (0.01)
GDPPC - - 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.35) (1.62) (2.43)** (2.40)*
EDUCAT - - 0.015 0.021 0.025 0.024
(0.70) (0.99) (1.16) (1.10)
RISK - - -0.028 -0.004 -0.029 -0.045
(1.14) (0.15) (0.92) (1.14)
POP - - 0.035 0.054 0.062 0.063
(1.58) (2.17)** (2.47)** (2.42)**
TREND - - - -0.205 -0.127 -
(1.66)* (0.99) -
FUEL - - - - -1.895 -2.037
(1.99)* (2.08)*
Adj-R2 0.0260 0.0287 0.0272 0.0402 0.0634 0.0701
F-Statistics 2.17* 2.19* 2.28* 1.99* 2.15* 2.31*
Number 132 132 132 132 132 132
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of the parameters at 1, 5, and 10 %
significance level respectively. White-corrected t-statistics are in the parenthesis.
Column 2 and 6 include time or year dummy variables for each of the sample year as
independent variables.  For brevity, I do not report them in the table.  In summary, there
is an increasing trend of foreign investment over the sample years.
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Discussion
The above results reveal a consistent support for the positive impact of
governance, legal system and economic freedom on the flow of foreign invest-
ment in the MENA region.  Among the three determinants, governance showed
the most significant results followed by legal system and then economic free-
dom.   The relatively lower importance of the last two determinants could be
due to the fact that investors from different countries have varying degrees of
tolerance for imperfections in the host country’s investment environment.
Hewko (2002) suggested that a foreign investor from a country with a tradition
of corruption and weak enforcement of contract may not be as discouraged by
the flawed legal system as an investor from a country with an ideal legal sys-
tem. Similarly Perry (2001) noted that investors are generally insensitive to the
nature of the host country’s legal system and that their perceptions and expec-
tations of the country’s legal system may be significantly affected by such fac-
tors as their nationality, export orientation and size.  The most important factor
in attracting foreign investors is profitable business opportunities. This was
obvious in post communist countries after perestroika where many foreign
investors established presence despite the primitive and underdeveloped legal
system.  It is also currently much more apparent in Iraq.  In the presence of
good business opportunities investors are willing to factor into their risk analy-
sis the lack of an efficient legal system (Hewko, 2002).
Similar reasoning could also apply to economic freedom.
Furthermore, one could also argue that some of the variables found to have a
significant effect on FDI flows in certain countries might not be transferable to
the MENA region. A recent paper has shown that MENA countries are differ-
ent from other developing countries with regards to FDI flows. Some of the
determinants of FDI flows to developing countries are not significant for FDI
flows to MENA countries (Onyeiwu, 2003).  Although a review of the relevant
literature would suggest that the degree of economic freedom in the host coun-
try could be a crucial determinant of FDI decisions, it is possible that the rela-
tive importance of trade openness - one of the 3 factors comprising the eco-
nomic freedom index in this paper - could have biased the above results.  While
trade openness has been found to be consistently significant for FDI flows at
the 1 percent level (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Culem, 1988; Edwards, 1990;
Asiedu, 2002; Onyeiwu, 2003). However, its impact on the MENA region has
been found to be very small.  One standard deviation increase in trade openness
resulted in just a 0.002 standard deviation increase in FDI flows to a MENA
country (Onyeiwu, 2003). The author attributed such low marginal impact to
the unusually high trade protection in the MENA region, which on average is
not only the highest in the developing world but also the slowest to come down
(Srinivasan, 2002, p.1).  He suggested that a highly protective economy
requires a substantial, not a token, increase in openness in order to attract a
large flow of FDI.
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Conclusion
While many regional, bilateral and unilateral efforts have led to a remark-
ably favorable government policy towards foreign investment activities around
the world, differences still exist in the scope and depth of the free-flow of for-
eign investments and the operations of MNCs (Fatouros, 1990). Foreign invest-
ment activities can play a significant role in the development process of host
economies. In addition to capital inflows, foreign investment activities can be
a vehicle for obtaining foreign technology, knowledge, managerial skills, and
improving the international competitiveness of firms and the economic per-
formance of countries (UNCTAD, 1998).  Foreign activities in terms of direct
investment are probably one of the most significant factors leading to the glob-
alization of the international economy (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002).  
As the MENA region competes for economic benefits for its citizens in
the new global economy, it is important that the policy makers in these coun-
tries evaluate their comparative advantage and their relative strengths (weak-
ness) in attracting foreign investment in their respective countries.  Given the
recent shift toward efficiency seeking investments in developing countries
(Dunning, 2002), it is imperative for the market and resource limited MENA
countries to improve their quality of governance and transparency; to promote
a legal system that protects shareholders and creditors rights; and to enhance
their economic freedom with more open trade and better protection of proper-
ty rights. 
Beside country based improvement a significant increase in FDI inflow
could also be achieved if the entire MENA region is promoted as an integrated
field of investment. Not only will foreign investors be able to see increased effi-
ciency but also an integrated regional market would enlarge capacity and
ensure scale effect in relatively small national markets. If these elements are
ignored, not only will foreign investor not invest, it is likely that even local
investors will take their investments abroad (Reese and Weisbach 2003). 
Endnotes
1  The Middle East Forum Website: http://www.meforum.org/
2 Following Asiedu (2002) I do not distinguish between local market and non-local mar-
ket seeking FDI. There are other definitions of FDI, see World Development Indicator
Report on FDI for more details.  
3 I attempt some robustness check of our estimations by using a one year lag variable for
all independent variables.  Although our key variables Governance, Legal System and
Economic Freedom variables still show a strong and statistically significant impact on
the dependent variable, as shown in my reported result, my over all model statistics, R-
squared and F-statistics, showed a weaker impact especially in estimations that do not
use Israel as a sample country.  These results are available upon request.
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4  As mentioned earlier that I have estimated alternative regressions using JV and FDI as
dependent variables separately.  In both cases, the result came out to be similar to the
reported results except the regressions using FDI only as a dependent variable had pro-
vided stronger statistical significance of parameters and higher adjusted R-squared rel-
ative to the estimations using JV only as the dependent variable.  These results are avail-
able upon request.
5 The sample size of 12 countries may be a cause of the relatively low adjusted R-squared. 
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